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 PART I
The Debate between 
Conciliatory and Steadfast 
Theorists  

A. Steadfastness

 1 Dashed hopes 
 The question at the centre of this volume is:  what ought one to do, epistemically speaking, when 
faced with a disagreement? Faced with this question, one naturally hopes for an answer that 
is principled, general, and intuitively satisfying. We want to argue that this is a vain hope. 
Our claim is that a satisfying answer will prove elusive because of  non-transparency : that 
there is no condition such that we are always in a position to know whether it obtains. 
When we take seriously that there is nothing, including our own minds, to which we 
have assured access, the familiar project of formulating epistemic norms is destabilized. In 
this paper, we will show how this plays out in the special case of disagreement. But we 
believe that a larger lesson can ultimately be extracted from our discussion: namely, that 
non-transparency threatens our hope for fully satisfying epistemic norms in general. 
 To explore how non-transparency limits our prospects for formulating a satisfying 
disagreement norm, we will put forward what we call the  Knowledge Disagreement Norm 
(KDN). This norm falls out of a broadly knowledge-centric epistemology: that is, an 
 epistemology that maintains that knowledge is the  telos of our epistemic activity. We will 
then explore the ways in which KDN might be thought to be defective. In particular, we 
will explore the ways in which KDN fails to satisfy some common  normative or  evaluative 
intuitions. We will show, in turn, how this failure is a result of the non-transparency of 
knowledge: that is, the fact that one is not always in a position to know whether oneself, 
or someone else, knows a given proposition. We will then argue that this kind of failure is 
inescapable, as any plausible epistemic norm will feature a non-transparent condition. We 
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will conclude with some tentative remarks about what this might mean for the disa-
greement debate in particular and the project of formulating satisfying epistemic 
norms more generally. Ultimately we leave it to the reader to decide how bleak our 
case really is. 
 2 Some semantic preliminaries 
 When addressing the question ‘What ought one to do, epistemically speaking, in the 
face of disagreement?’ it can be useful to refl ect on the semantics of ought-claims, and, 
in particular, the way in which ought-claims are notoriously context-sensitive. For 
‘ought’ is one of a family of modals that, while retaining a barebones logical structure 
across its uses, is fl exible in its contribution to the meaning of sentences. For example, 
there is a use of  ‘ought’ connected to particular desires or ends, as in: ‘The burglar ought 
to use the back door, since it’s unlocked.’ 2 There is also a use connected to legal or moral 
norms, as in: ‘You ought to go to jail if you murder someone.’ 3 And there is a use that is 
(arguably) connected to the evidential situation of an individual or group, as in: ‘He 
ought to be in London by now.’ 4 
 Even within any one of these broad categories, there is considerable scope for con-
text-dependence. For example, the truth conditions of a deontic ought-claim will also 
be sensitive to which facts are held fi xed in the conversational context. For example, 
when one says of a criminal ‘he ought to have gone to jail’, one is holding fi xed the fact 
of the crime. By contrast, when one says ‘he ought to have never started on a life of 
crime’, one isn’t holding fi xed the fact of the crime. Indeed it is plausible to suppose—
and contemporary semantic wisdom does indeed suppose—that the semantic contri-
bution of ‘ought’ is in general contextually sensitive to both a relevant domain of 
situations (the ‘modal base’), and to a relevant mode of ranking those situations (‘the 
ordering source’). 5 On a popular and plausible version of this account, ‘It ought to be 
that  p ’ is true relative to a domain of situations and a mode of ordering just in case there 
is some situation in the domain such that  p holds at it and at all situations ranked equal to or 
higher than it. Where there are only fi nitely many situations, this is equivalent to the con-
straint that  p holds at all of the best situations. Note that this toy semantics has the conse-
quence that fi nite closure holds for ought-claims. If ‘It ought to be that  p 
1
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 ’ is true for a fi nite set of premises, then ‘It ought to be that  q ’ is true for any proposition 
 2 This use is sometimes called ‘bouletic’.  
 3 This use is typically called ‘deontic’.  
 4 This is the so-called ‘epistemic’ use. For further discussion see John Hawthorne, ‘The Epistemic Ought’ 
(in progress). The above taxonomy is not intended to be canonical or exhaustive.  
 5 The more technical terminology is due to Angelika Kratzer, who has done a great deal to promote the 
picture wherein modals like ‘can’, ‘ought’, and ‘must’ have an invariant core logical structure across their uses, 
and where a semantic value gets set by domain and mode of ordering.  See notably Angelika Kratzer, ‘What 
“Must” and “Can” Must and Can Mean’,  Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (1977): 337–55. See also Kai von Fintel 
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entailed by that set. 6 ,  7 This style of semantics is by no means sacrosanct, but it is one that 
will be in the background of our thinking in this paper. From this perspective, the ques-
tion ‘What ought one to do when one encounters a disagreement?’ can thus be clarifi ed 
by considering how the key contextual factors—ordering source and modal base—are 
being resolved at the context at which the question is being raised. 
 3 The Knowledge Disagreement Norm 
 From the perspective of a knowledge-centric epistemology—that is, an epistemology 
that takes the most central goal of our epistemic activity to be knowledge—it is natural 
to rank outcomes with knowledge over outcomes of withholding belief, which are in 
turn ranked over outcomes of knowledge-less belief: 8 
 The Knowledge Disagreement Norm (KDN): In a case of disagreement about whether  p , where S 
believes that  p and H believes that not- p : 
 (i)  S ought to trust H and believe that not- p iff  were S to trust H, this would result in S’s 
knowing not- p 9 
 6 Note that within the framework of this semantics, apparent counterexamples to fi nite closure will be 
handled by appeal to context-shift. ‘It ought to be that some murderers are never released from jail’ sounds 
true, while ‘It ought to be that there are some murderers’ sounds false, and yet the that-clause of the former 
claim entails that of the latter. The standard resolution of this problem within the framework presented here 
says that contexts in which one says ‘It ought to be that there are some murderers’ would almost inevitably 
take a modal base that includes some non-murderer worlds (rendering the claim false), but contexts in which 
one utters the fi rst sentence tend to hold fi xed many more facts, including that there are some murderers.  
 7 There will however be counterexamples to countable closure, the principle that extends the closure 
principle to any countable set of premises. Relevant here are infi nitary normative dilemmas—that is, cases in 
which whatever one does of an infi nite range of actions, one does something that one ought not to do. Sup-
pose God allows one to fi ll out a blank cheque to a deserving charity with any natural number in pounds 
sterling. And suppose the relevant ranking is by size of gift; the bigger the gift, the better. One ought to write 
 some amount down since situations in which one does this clearly outrank the situation in which one writes 
nothing down. But one ought not give exactly one pound since there are situations where one gives more 
than one pound that outrank any situation where one gives one pound.  And one ought not give exactly two 
pounds for analogous reasons. . . . Hence anything one does is something that one ought not to do. Here we 
can generate a counterexample to countable closure by noting that the countable set of premises of the form 
‘It ought to be that one does not give exactly N pounds’ (where N is a natural number greater or equal to 1) 
entails that it ought to be that one does not give some non-zero natural number of pounds.  
 8 We are operating with an altogether natural gloss on ‘S and H disagree about whether  p ’, where this 
requires that S believe  p and H believe not- p . At least as we ordinarily use the term, it is less natural to 
describe a case in which S believes  p and H is agnostic about  p as a case in which S ‘disagrees’ with H as to 
whether  p .  
 9 We might want to screen off  cases in which the closest world in which one trusts H, the truth-value of 
 p is diff erent to the truth-value of  p at the actual world. (In essence, this would involve restricting the modal 
base to worlds that match the actual world with regard to the truth-value of  p ). We can do this with a slightly 
more complicated counterfactual: S ought to trust H that not- p iff  were S to trust H, and  p have the truth-
value it actually does, this would result in S’s knowing not- p . Alternatively, we might want to complicate the 
test as follows: S ought to trust H iff  (i) were S to trust H, S would come to know not- p , and (ii) were S to 
stick to her guns, S wouldn’t come to know  p . A test case: Fred says to you ‘You believe everything I say’. 
You actually don’t believe this claim, and for  that reason the claim isn’t true; however, if you were to believe 
the claim, it would be both true and known by you . . . For the sake of simplicity we ignore these interesting 
complications. Thanks to Cian Dorr here.  
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 (ii)  S ought to dismiss H and continue to believe that  p iff  were S to stick to her guns this 
would result in S’s knowing  p , and 
 (iii)  in all other cases, S ought to suspend judgment about whether  p . 10 
 According to KDN, one should be ‘conciliatory’ in the face of disagreement—that is, 
give up one’s belief that  p and trust one’s disagreeing interlocutor that not- p —just in 
case so trusting would lead one to know that not- p . Since (it is generally granted) trust-
ing someone who knows is a method of acquiring knowledge oneself, (i) recommends 
that S trust H in cases where H  knows that not- p . 11 Being conciliatory in such cases will 
lead S to greater knowledge. 12 According to KDN, one should be ‘dogmatic’ in the face 
of disagreement—that is, dismiss one’s interlocutor and continue to believe  p —if one 
knows that  p . What about disagreement cases where neither S nor H knows whether  p ? 
In such a case, KDN demands that S suspend judgment. 13 
 There are a few things worth noting from the outset about KDN. First, KDN is 
inspired by knowledge-centric epistemology, an epistemology that takes the  telos of belief 
and epistemic practice more generally to be knowledge. 14 One might have, by contrast, a 
 10 By suspending judgment we mean that one doesn’t fl at out believe the proposition or its negation. This 
is compatible with being very confi dent that a proposition is true or false; for example, one may be very 
confi dent that one is going to lose a lottery without fl at out believing that one will.  
 11 We ignore complications having to do with cases where even though H knows  p , H wouldn’t know  p 
were S to trust H.  
 12 Of course, there are cases in which trusting someone who knows might not result in knowing one-
self—and certain kinds of disagreement might produce such cases. We discuss a view on which disagreement 
(or a subset of disagreements) ‘defeats’ the knowledge-transferring power of trust shortly.  
 13 Tying ought-claims to counterfactuals gives contestable results in some cases. Suppose S is asked to 
donate some small amount of money to charity, and that it would be best (morally speaking) for S to donate 
the money and then continue on with her life as usual. But suppose further that, if S donated the money, 
she would fl y into a rage and go on a killing spree. Insofar as we test for the truth of  ‘S ought to do A’ by 
looking at the closest world where S does A, it is then true that S ought to make the donation and return 
to life as normal, but  not true that S ought to make the donation. Thus, tying ought-claims to counterfactuals 
runs the risk of violating the principle that if S ought to A and B, then S ought to A. (For a possible fi x see 
the next footnote).  
 14 An attachment to a knowledge-centric epistemology need not lead us in a forced march to KDN. 
KDN ranks actions according to their counterfactual outcomes. But insofar as the domain of possibilities 
relevant to a normative claim concerning an action type involves more than the closest world where the 
action type is performed, there will be natural modes of ordering that violate KDN. Imagine, for example, 
that S currently knows  p , and that if she were to continue to believe  p  for her current reasons , she would con-
tinue to know  p ; however, if S were to stick to her guns with regard to  p , her basis for believing  p would, as 
it happens, change to poor reasons, such that she would no longer know  p . If the domain of worlds getting 
ranked includes worlds where the basis does not change, ‘S ought to stick to her guns and not change her 
basis’ will be true, and (recall fi nite closure) so will ‘S ought to stick to her guns’, even though the counter-
factual ‘If S were to stick to her guns she would maintain knowledge’ is false. One can improve on KDN 
with the following amendment: one ought to stick to one’s guns  iff  there is some way (where context pro-
vides the relevant space of ways of acting) of sticking to one’s guns such that were one to stick to one’s guns 
in that way one would maintain knowledge (and similarly for the other clauses). Take the person who 
believes  p for bad reasons but has a good basis available. In a context in which the modal base includes worlds 
where the basis is switched, the claim ‘S ought to stick to her guns’ will come out true. In contexts where 
the subject’s bad basis is held fi xed, the ought-claim will come out false. This kind of context-dependence 
is exactly what one should expect. We do not dispute the need for such a refi nement of KDN, and perhaps 
no counterfactual formulation is in the end problem-free. But as our discussion does not turn on the letter 
of KDN, we take the liberty of ignoring the needed refi nements in the main text.  
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justifi cation-centric epistemology, according to which the  telos of belief is mere justifi ed 
belief, or a truth-centric epistemology, according to which the  telos of belief is mere true 
belief. Each of these alternative views could lead to disagreement norms that are analo-
gous to the knowledge-centric KDN. While we will not discuss these possibilities here, 
much of the discussion that follows applies to them as well. 
 Second, KDN says nothing about how S and H should respond in cases where their 
disagreement is a matter of divergent credences as opposed to confl icts of all-or-nothing 
belief. Despite the prevailing trend in the disagreement debate, our discussion will for 
the most part proceed without mention of credences. We fi nd this a natural starting 
point; our pre-theoretic grip on the phenomenon of disagreement tends to be in terms 
of confl icts of all-or-nothing belief. 
 Third, note that compliance with KDN will not necessarily result in overall know-
ledge maximization. Suppose S disagrees with H about whether Jack and Jill went up 
the hill together. If H were to trust S, H would come to know that Jack and Jill indeed 
went up the hill together, but he would also abductively come to believe a cluster of false 
propositions based on the (false) hypothesis that Jack and Jill are having an aff air. In 
short, KDN is locally consequentialist with respect to the  telos of knowledge. Less local 
consequentialisms are of course also possible, and we shall return to this issue in due 
course. 
 Fourth, KDN’s gesture towards knowledge as epistemic  telos can be unpacked in vari-
ous ways, corresponding to diff erent meta-epistemological views. On one gloss, the 
relevant ‘ought’ is bouletic/desire-based: what makes KDN true is that the ‘ought’ is 
grounded in an (actual or idealized) desire of the disagreeing parties to maintain or gain 
knowledge about the disputed issue. On another gloss, the relevant ‘ought’ is based on a 
ranking implicit in certain, say, social norms, thereby rendering the ‘ought’ in KDN a 
kind of deontic ‘ought’. On a more robustly realist tack, one might think the ‘ought’ of 
KDN is tied to a valuational structure that is desire- and social norm-transcendent. We 
shall not attempt to adjudicate between these diff erent views here, remaining silent for 
the most part on questions of meta-epistemology. 
 Fifth, and fi nally, conditions (i) and (ii) of KDN will have less bite to the extent that 
disagreement has the eff ect of automatically defeating knowledge or automatically 
defeating the knowledge-transferring capacity of trust. Now, no one thinks that  all 
instances of disagreement have these defeat-eff ects. For, in many cases of disagreement—
in particular, where only one of the two disagreeing parties is an expert, or where one 
party possesses more evidence than the other—it is obviously true that one can con-
tinue to know in the face of disagreement, and that one can come to know by trusting 
one’s disagreeing interlocutor. For example, imagine that Tim believes no one is at 
home; he calls Ana on her mobile from his offi  ce, and expresses this belief. Ana dis-
agrees—because she, in fact, is at home. Obviously Ana continues to know that some-
one (indeed, she) is at home, and Tim can come to know this himself by trusting Ana. 
While disagreement does not always destroy knowledge and the knowledge-transmit-
ting power of trust, it is a live question whether it does so in a wide range of the more 
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 interesting cases of disagreement. A vexed question, central to the disagreement debate, 
is whether knowledge is defeated in certain kinds of cases involving ‘peers’. 15 Many 
favour a view on which knowledge is defeated in cases of peer disagreement. In general, 
the greater the number of cases in which disagreement defeats knowledge or the know-
ledge-transferring capacities of trust, the more cases of disagreement will be relegated to 
the auspices of (iii). That is, the more disagreement defeats knowledge or the know-
ledge-conferring power of trust, the more KDN will recommend suspending judg-
ment. In the following discussion, we will assume for the most part that knowledge (and 
the knowledge-conferring power of trust) is left undefeated by disagreement. As a result, 
those who are sympathetic with defeatist views will fi nd our descriptions of some cases 
of disagreement to be jarring or even incoherent. In due course, we shall discuss whether 
and to what extent various purported limitations of KDN can be overcome by taking 
the phenomenon of defeat more seriously. 
 4 The normative inadequacy of KDN 
 Many will already be unhappy with KDN. In particular, one might be worried about 
cases in which one is simply not in a position to know what specifi c action—being dog-
matic, conciliatory, or suspending judgment—KDN recommends. For there are possi-
ble cases of disagreement in which one knows but fails to know that one knows, 16 and 
cases in which one doesn’t know but isn’t in a position to know that one doesn’t know. 
(And even more obviously, cases where one’s disagreeing interlocutor knows but one 
does not know that he knows—indeed any case where one’s disagreeing interlocutor 
knows will fi t this profi le at the time of disagreement since if one knew one knew at  t 
one wouldn’t be disagreeing at  t ). In such cases, even if one knows that one ought to 
conform to KDN, one is not in a position to know what specifi c action one should 
undertake to achieve that conformity. We might say that in such cases, one is not in a 
position to know what KDN ‘demands of one’. Imagine the following situation: Sally 
and Harry are disagreeing about whether  p . In fact,  p is true, and Sally knows this, but she 
isn’t in a position to know that she knows this. 17 Harry (falsely) believes not- p , and 
(as very often happens), he is not in a position to know that he doesn’t know this. Imag-
ine further that Sally can maintain her knowledge that  p by being dogmatic and that 
 15 Typically what is meant by ‘peer’ in the disagreement literature is opaque, in part because the relevant 
notion of evidence used in glosses on peerhood is not fully spelled out. For example, if knowledge is evi-
dence and peers by defi nition possess the same (relevant) evidence, then disagreements in which one person 
knows and the other does not are  ipso facto not peer disagreements. We shall as far as possible avoid talk of 
peerhood in our discussion, at least in part because we do not want to get involved in tendentious issues 
about the nature of evidence. Note that KDN is meant to apply to all instances of disagreement, including 
‘peer’ disagreements if there be any.  
 16 Defenders of the KK principle will deny that such cases are possible. For a general argument against 
the KK principle, see  Timothy Williamson,  Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000) .  
 17 Perhaps because a belief that she knows  p , while true, would not be suffi  ciently safe for knowledge.  
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Harry can come to know  p by trusting Sally. 18 Since neither party is in a position to 
know the facts about knowledge relevant to KDN, neither party is in a position to know 
precisely what action KDN demands of him or her. 19 To be somewhat more precise, we 
might say that KDN is not  perfectly  operationalizable , where a norm N (of the form ‘S 
ought to F in circumstances G’) is  perfectly operationalizable iff , whenever one knows 
N and is in G, one is in a position to engage in a piece of knowledgeable practical 
 reasoning  20 of the form:
 (1) I am in circumstances G 
 (2) I ought to F in G 
 (3) I can F by A-ing 
 where A is a basic (mental or physical) act type that one knows how to perform. As the 
case of Sally and Harry shows, KDN is not perfectly operationalizable. This is because 
one is not always in a position to know whether one knows, and not always in a position 
to know whether one’s interlocutor knows. In other words, the relevant kinds of know-
ledge-related conditions are  non-transparent , where a condition C is transparent just in 
case, whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know whether it obtains. 21 Since know-
ledge is non-transparent, KDN is not perfectly operationalizable. 22 
 Prima facie, KDN’s imperfect operationalizability is troubling, and seems to count 
against KDN. But how should we make sense of this intuition? 
 As a fi rst pass, we might worry that its imperfect operationalizability makes KDN 
ineligible as  advice . That is, while KDN might specify some ideal ranking of outcomes, it 
is not the kind of thing that can be off ered to actual agents as a guide to action. For an 
ought-claim to be a suitable vehicle of advice (this line of thinking goes), it must use an 
ordering source whose application to candidate actions can be known. If the ‘ought’ 
relies on a mode of ranking such that one sometimes can’t know how a candidate action 
is ranked, then that use of ‘ought’ is unsuitable for an advisory role. 
 18 Of course there is an extended sense in which, insofar as Harry is in a position to trust Sally, he is in a 
position to come to know that his belief that not- p is not a case of knowledge. For once he comes to know 
 p he can deduce that his former belief that not- p is not a case of knowledge. ‘In a position to know’ is nor-
mally used with a narrower ambit. And in any case Harry is not in a position to know whether KDN 
demands trust in advance of engaging in trust.  
 19 There is also the case where Harry believes not- p and knows he doesn’t know not- p but doesn’t know 
whether Sally knows not- p . Here Harry is in a position to know that KDN recommends the cessation of 
belief but not in a position to know whether KDN recommends trust or instead suspension.  
 20 By ‘knowledgeable’ practical reasoning we mean practical reasoning that involves knowing each of the 
premises involved.  
 21 We borrow this terminology from Williamson (2000), ch. 4. Williamson defi nes a condition C as  lumi-
nous just in case, whenever S is in C, she is in a position to know she is in C. Let us say that a condition C 
is  absence-luminous just in case, whenever S is not in C, she is in a position to know she is not in C; and (fol-
lowing Williamson) that a condition C as  transparent just in case it is both luminous and absence-luminous. 
 22 Of course a little more than the transparency of knowledge would be needed for knowledge of the 
relevant counterfactuals. Still we take it the most obvious and central obstacle to the perfect operationaliz-
ability of KDN is the non-transparency of knowledge.  
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 How far does this worry take us? First, note that it often depends on conversational 
context whether, in proff ering a bit of advice, one presupposes operationalizability. Sup-
pose you are advising Jane on the giving of an award, and you say: ‘You ought to give the 
award to the person who just walked through the door.’ Uttered in a typical context, this 
presupposes that Jane knows (or is at least in a position to know) who just walked 
through the door. But one could also reasonably advise Jane as follows: ‘You ought to 
give the award to the most deserving person. I realise that it’s often diffi  cult to tell who 
the most deserving person is.’ Here, one is recommending that the award be given to the 
most deserving person, but one by no means expects the recommendation to be opera-
tionalizable in the sense above. But so long as one does not falsely presuppose operation-
alizability, it is far from clear that there is anything  ipso facto wrong about articulating an 
imperfectly operationalizable norm as advice. After all, there can be instances in which 
one can’t incorporate a norm in knowledgeable practical reasoning but nonetheless has 
good evidence about what a norm recommends. Suppose Hanna gives you the advice: 
‘You ought to put out as many chairs as there are guests.’ You have good evidence 
that there will be six guests, but you don’t know this. Hanna’s advice is hardly improper 
or useless, despite your not being able to incorporate it into knowledgable practical 
reasoning. 
 Indeed, even if off ering a norm  as advice presupposed a sort of operationalizability, this 
is at most a constraint on advice  at a context , not in general. That is, just because there are 
cases in which KDN exhibits operationalizability-failures, this does not preclude it from 
 ever being useful as advice; it will count as advice in those contexts, at least, when it is 
operationalizable. So while it is false that whenever we know, we know we know, it is 
perfectly plausible that there are plenty of disagreement cases in which we both know 
and know we know. In such cases, one might well know what KDN demands of one. 
(Of course one will never  know KDN demands trust in a situation in which one’s inter-
locutor knows  p and one believes not- p and where such knowledge would be transmit-
ted by trust—though insofar as one knows one doesn’t know  p one will be in a position 
to know that KDN entails that ought to stop believing  p .) 23 
 If the conditions relevant to KDN were transparent, then every (rational) attempt to 
conform to KDN would be successful. But since they are non-transparent, (rational) 
attempts to conform to KDN might fail. For this reason KDN can easily fail to be good 
advice because trying to follow it, or exhorting others to follow it, does not guarantee 
conformity with it. To what extent do these mismatches between trying and succeeding 
constitute a major defi ciency of KDN? 24 
 The fi rst thing to say here is that it is no count against KDN in particular that  trying to 
comply with it does not always succeed. For this fate will likely affl  ict any norm. This is 
 23 Leaving aside recherché cases, if there be such, where one knows that one knows  p and also believes 
not- p .  
 24 Or we might think that this shows us that KDN is incomplete; to borrow some terminology from 
ethics, we might say that KDN is a ‘criterion of right’, but that what is (also) needed is a ‘decision procedure’ 
that tells agents how to  decide what to do. Thanks to Andreas Mogensen.  
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very obvious in, say, the case of act utilitarianism, since trying to be a good utilitarian 
will (likely) result in less overall happiness than might have otherwise been enjoyed—
say, by following the norms of commonsense morality. But it is also plausibly true with 
relatively more transparent norms. For example, suppose we had an ordering source that 
ranked actions according to how much one felt like doing them, and thus a norm that 
said that one ought to do what one most felt like doing. One is generally in a position to 
know what one feels like doing. But of course one can be mistaken about what one feels 
like doing, and one can be mistaken about  how much one feels like doing something 
compared to something else. Insofar as the facts about what and how much one feels like 
doing things are non-transparent, then  trying to do that which one most feels like doing 
will not always be a guaranteed way of doing that which in fact ranks highest (even if 
one always succeeds in doing what one tries to do). Since no plausible ordering source is 
transparent (we return to this theme shortly), no plausible norm is such that  trying to do 
what one ought to do will guarantee in fact doing what one ought to do. 25 
 Of course, one could still ask: what general advice should we give about responding 
to disagreement, given that we want to maximize conformity with KDN over some 
extended period of time? Probably, exhorting people to conform to KDN isn’t the best 
way of doing this. Indeed, the answer to this question will turn on a vast number of open 
empirical questions about how people respond to disagreement and advice, relevant 
trade-off s between agents’ storage capacity and the compliance-generation of particular 
bits of advice, and so on. This computation becomes even more vexed when we con-
sider the eff ects that certain bits of advice will have in the long run or across a range of 
possible worlds.  And it’s worth remembering that the answer to this question might 
turn out to be very odd indeed. Given the oddities of human psychology, it might turn 
out that we ought to, say, advise people to, inter alia, drink a glass of water or take a deep 
breath when confronted by disagreement. In all likelihood, the correct answer to this 
question is not going to resemble the kind of norms that are put forward by epistemolo-
gists—whether it be KDN or any other candidate disagreement norm. 
 In sum, the fact that trying to comply with KDN will not guarantee compliance with 
KDN is itself of no especial concern, for it is plausibly true of any norm. If instead we 
simply want to know what general advice we should disseminate with regard to dis-
agreement, then we have switched over to an empirical question that, while perhaps 
interesting, is well beyond the purview of the standard debate about disagreement. 
 Worries that turn on the advisory role of norms have not amounted to much. Here is 
a second (and we think, better) pass at what is worrying about KDN: it severs a natural 
tie between an agent’s evaluative status—how praiseworthy or blameworthy that agent 
is—and facts about what the agent ought to do. The imperfect operationalizability of 
KDN generates cases in which one does what one ought to do (according to KDN) but 
is intuitively  blameworthy for so doing, and conversely cases in which one does what one 
 25 Note also that if there are no transparent conditions, then no decision procedure will be perfectly 
operationalizable either.(See fn. 24.)  
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ought not to do (according to KDN) but is intuitively  blameless for so doing. Consider 
the following:
 Clairvoyant Maud. 26 Maud is a clairvoyant, and uses her clairvoyance to come to know that the 
British prime minister is in New York, though she doesn’t know that she knows this. Her friends, 
who are members of Parliament and therefore usually know the whereabouts of the prime 
minister, assure her that the prime minister is in fact at 10 Downing Street. Maud, moreover, 
doesn’t even believe she is clairvoyant, as she has been exposed to plenty of evidence that sug-
gests that clairvoyance is impossible. Nonetheless, Maud dismisses her friends and continues to 
believe that the prime minister is New York. 
 Let us stipulate that it is possible to gain knowledge through clairvoyance, and that 
although Maud’s evidence that clairvoyance is impossible means that she isn’t in a posi-
tion to  know that she knows that the prime minister is in New York, she nonetheless 
does know his location. 27 Then Maud, in being dogmatic, conforms to KDN; if she were 
instead to be conciliatory in the face of the disagreement, she would lose her knowledge 
that the prime minister is in New York. Nonetheless, it seems that Maud is doing some-
thing epistemically irresponsible by being dogmatic. We feel a strong intuitive pull 
towards the judgment that Maud is doing what she ought not do, for she is maintaining 
a belief even when she has overwhelming (albeit misleading) evidence that she isn’t 
clairvoyant, and thus doesn’t know the disputed proposition. We can’t help thinking that 
Maud is playing with epistemic fi re, exhibiting poor habits of mind that just happen, in 
this rare case, to serve her well. Thus, KDN allows for instances of what we might call 
‘blameworthy right-doing’: that is, cases in which S intuitively does something blame-
worthy, though according to KDN she does what she ought to do. 
 Cases of blameworthy right-doing can also be generated in instances where one trusts 
a disagreeing interlocutor whom one has (misleading) reason to believe doesn’t know. 
For example, imagine that one of Maud’s friends, John, despite his evidence that Maud is 
not clairvoyant and thus  doesn’t know that the prime minister is in New York, trusts Maud 
and comes to believe that he is. Here, John is doing what he ought to do— assuming that 
the knowledge-transmitting capacity of trust is not defeated by the  disagreement—though 
it seems, intuitively, that he is blameworthy for doing so. In both of these instances of 
blameworthy right-doing, the agents conform to KDN while not being in a position to 
know that they are doing what they ought to do. Generally, these instances of blamewor-
thy right-doing are instances where S conforms to KDN but where it is likely on S’s 
evidence that she doesn’t so conform. Let’s call this  evidential blameworthy right-doing. 
 26 This case is adapted from Laurence BonJour, ‘Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge’,  Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy , 5 (1980), 53-73. BonJour uses this case to argue against a simple reliabilist theory of 
knowledge, on which S knows  p just in case  p and S uses a reliable method to believe  p . BonJour concludes 
from the Clairvoyant Maud case that having overwhelming but misleading evidence that one’s method  isn’t 
reliable defeats knowledge. In response to BonJour’s case, many externalists embrace a view on which justi-
fi cation/knowledge can be defeated by misleading evidence. We discuss this ‘defeatist’ view shortly.  
 27 In other words, her knowledge that the prime minister is in New York is undefeated by the evidence against 
clairvoyance.  
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 Arguably, there might also be instances of blameworthy right-doing where one  knows 
one is conforming to KDN. For example, consider the following case:
 Bridge Builder . Simon is an expert bridge engineer. He is constructing a bridge to span a large 
river, which thousands of commuters will cross each day. Simon has done the relevant calcula-
tions, and knows precisely how many struts are required to hold up the bridge. Simon’s col-
league, Arthur, a more junior but competent engineer, disagrees with Simon’s assessment, saying 
that more struts are required. 
 Let us stipulate that Simon not only knows how many struts are required, but also 
knows that he knows this. Arthur, while almost always right himself, makes mistakes on 
a few more occasions, and Simon knows this. According to KDN, Simon should dis-
miss Arthur and be dogmatic about the number of struts required. Indeed, Simon is in 
a position to know that he should do this, since ( ex hypothesi ) he not only knows how 
many struts are required, but moreover knows that he knows. Nonetheless, if Simon 
were to simply dismiss Arthur, we would likely feel that this would be problematic. 
Why is this? 
 The problem isn’t that for all Simon knows Arthur might be right, since Simon,  ex 
hypothesi , knows Arthur is wrong. And the problem with dismissing Arthur can’t be that 
for all Simon knows, it will turn out upon consulting with Arthur that Simon doesn’t 
now know after all. If, as we are supposing in the present discussion, disagreement doesn’t 
defeat knowledge, then knowing one knows renders an eventuality like Bridge Builder 
live. 28 What seems problematic about Simon’s dismissal of Arthur is that Simon is instill-
ing in himself a bad habit—that is, a habit of boldly going on even in the face of disa-
greement, a habit that might easily lead him to disastrous consequences. Our nervousness 
about Simon’s dogmatism, we would like to suggest, turns on our recognition that if 
Simon were in a case where he in fact didn’t know how many struts were required, the 
habit he is instilling in himself in the case where he  does know might easily lead him to 
act similarly dogmatically, thus building an unsafe bridge and threatening the lives of 
thousands. Of course, if Simon were always in a position to know when he  didn’t know, 
there would be no such risk. That is, if Simon could always perfectly distinguish between 
cases in which he knows and doesn’t know, the habit he is instilling in himself would be 
fi ne. But since there are not unlikely eventualities in which Simon isn’t in a position to 
know that he doesn’t know—again, because knowledge is non-transparent—the habit 
he is instilling in himself by dismissing Arthur is problematic. Human beings are not 
creatures for whom the absence of knowledge is generally luminous; as such, it is simply 
not possible for humans to be dogmatic in cases where they know and not also be dog-
matic in cases where they falsely believe they know. That is, unless they are so selectively 
dogmatic in cases where they know they know that superfi cially similar situations do 
 28 A defeat-friendly approach brings its own oddities. If Simon knows that he knows, and knows that 
disagreement will automatically destroy his knowledge, then Simon seems to have excellent reason not to 
consult with Arthur in the fi rst place.  
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not arise. 29 We might call the kind of blameworthy right-doing displayed by Simon 
 habitual . 30 
 Conversely, KDN also results in cases of ‘blameless wrongdoing’, cases in which S 
intuitively does something that is  not blameworthy, but where she does what (according 
to KDN) she ought not to do. For example, if Clairvoyant Maud were conciliatory in 
the face of the disagreement with her high-powered friends, or if Bridge Builder Simon 
were to doubt himself upon learning that Arthur disagreed with him, they would be 
doing something intuitively praiseworthy, or at least blameless. But according to KDN, 
they would be failing to do what they ought to do. 
 Let us call the fact that KDN generates instances of both blameworthy right-doing 
and, conversely, virtuous wrongdoing, the problem of  normative divergence . There is a 
clear moral analogue to this problem. Take the following case:
 Grenade . A soldier is holding a grenade that is about to detonate, and he must decide to throw it 
either to his left or to his right. 
 Let’s assume that act consequentialism is the correct moral theory (or at least, more 
plausibly, that it is the correct moral theory with respect to Grenade). Then we might say 
that what the soldier ought to do is to conform to the following norm:
 Consequentialist Norm (CN): If S is faced with the choice of doing only either A or B, S ought 
to do A if it would produce less harm than doing B, ought to do B if it would produce less harm 
than doing A, and is permitted to do either if A and B would produce equal harm. 
 Imagine that the soldier in Grenade has misleading evidence that more harm will be 
done if he throws the grenade to the right. If he throws the grenade to the right, then he 
does (according to CN) what he ought not to have done, for he performed the action 
that resulted in greater harm. Nonetheless, he is obviously not  blameworthy for doing 
what he does. This is an instance of blameless wrongdoing. Now suppose instead the 
soldier throws the grenade to the left, because he wants to  maximize the possible harm of 
his action. In fact, his action minimizes the actual harm done; nonetheless, we certainly 
don’t want to say that his action was  praiseworthy . As such, the claim that (as CN entails) 
the soldier ought to throw the grenade to the left does not supply the grounds for 
appropriate normative evaluation of the soldier’s actions. Both KDN and CN, then, suf-
fer from the problem of normative divergence. That is, both link ‘ought’ to an ordering 
source that implies that there is no straightforward tie between what agents ought to do 
and the evaluative status of their actions or their character. 
 This, we take it, is what is most deeply troubling about KDN: it fails to secure a natu-
rally hoped-for tie between what agents ought to do and agents’ evaluative status. To 
 29 Suppose, for example, that while one often knows that one knows the result of an arithmetical sum, 
one sticks to one’s guns only in cases where one has triple checked.  
 30 Structurally similar issues arise when it comes to double-checking one’s answer. Suppose Simon knows 
that he knows but is someone who would not know that he does not know in reasonably similar calculation 
situations. In that case, and especially when a lot is at stake, we might fi nd it praiseworthy were he to suspend 
his belief only to reinstate it once he has double-checked his calculations.  
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accommodate this worry, one might try to modify KDN in one of two ways. One might 
think that, in addition to the ‘ought’ associated with KDN, we require a distinct kind of 
ranking of epistemic acts (yielding a distinct but associated use of ‘ought’), a ranking 
that is directly tied not to the value of various  outcomes but rather to the level of praise-
worthiness/blameworthiness of the agent’s  action , considered as an attempt to achieve 
those outcomes. This modifi cation would require two senses of ‘ought’ (an ‘objective 
ought’ and a ‘subjective ought’) as it applies to disagreement cases. Let us call this the 
 two-state solution . However, it might be thought that bifurcation involved in the two-
state solution creates an unacceptable rift between knowledge and epistemically virtu-
ous conduct, and in particular, that this rift drains knowledge of its normative status. 
So, one might attempt to tinker with the conditions on knowledge such that the two 
phenomena—conforming to KDN and doing what is epistemically praiseworthy—
line up. Note, after all, that in the most obvious cases of what we labelled ‘blameworthy 
right-doing’ and ‘blameless wrongdoing’, there was a mismatch between which act 
would in fact retain/produce knowledge, and which action was  likely on the evidence to 
retain/produce knowledge. If, for example, we allowed Maud’s evidence that she does 
not know to preclude her knowing—hence treating the original description of 
Clairvoyant Maud as incoherent—then those kind of putative cases of blameworthy 
right-doing would be ruled out. Let us call such a solution, on which epistemically 
blameworthy behaviour is incompatible with knowledge, the  defeatist  solution . Indeed, 
the desire to have an epistemology that captures our intuitions about epistemic blame-
worthiness seems to be a major motivation for standard defeatist views. Such views off er 
prima facie hope of making knowledge incompatible with non-virtuous epistemic 
conduct. By accepting such a view, we might hope to rescue KDN from the problem of 
normative divergence. We will discuss the defeatist solution in the next section, and the 
two-state solution in the one following. 
 5 Defeatism 
 How far does defeatism take us in overcoming normative divergence? Even if know-
ledge were incompatible with its being likely on one’s evidence that one does not know, 
this will not suffi  ce to collapse an outcome-driven ‘ought’ and a evaluation-driven 
‘ought’. For on any plausible account, the absence of knowledge is compatible with the 
likelihood of its presence. Suppose S does not know  p but has plenty of evidence that she 
does, is confronted with disagreement, and sticks to her guns. In so doing, S is in viola-
tion of KDN, but intuitively blameless; this is an instance of blameless wrongdoing. At 
most, then, a defeatist solution will do away with certain instances of blameworthy 
right-doing (e.g. Clairvoyant Maud). 
 How well might a defeatist view deal with blameworthy right-doing? Recall that 
the phenomenon of blameworthy right-doing divided into two sorts:  evidential and 
 habitual . In an instance of  evidential blameworthy right-doing (e.g. Clairvoyant Maud), 
S conforms to KDN though it is likely on her evidence that she is in violation of it. 
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In an instance of  habitual blameworthy right-doing (e.g. Bridge Builder), S conforms 
to KDN, and it is likely on her evidence that she is conforming to it, but nonetheless 
she does something epistemically blameworthy by inculcating in herself a dangerously 
dogmatic habit. 
 Let us take  habitual blameworthy right-doing fi rst. In these cases, S knows  p and 
knows that she knows  p , but in conforming to KDN inculcates in herself a habit that 
makes it likely that she will be dogmatic in similar cases in which she does not in fact 
know. According to the defeatist solution, on which blameworthy epistemic behaviour 
is incompatible with knowledge, such cases are impossible. Is this a plausible response? 
To get a better grip on such cases, let us take a practical analogy. Suppose two tennis 
players are each in situations where they know they know they can’t reach the ball in 
time. One player—call him Andi—gives up. Another, call him Raphael, chases the ball 
though (unsurprisingly) fails to get to it in time. Andi might deride Raphael as a pathetic 
fi gure, someone who gives chase while knowing the chase is futile. But we can see that 
because the absence of knowledge isn’t luminous, Andi risks turning himself into a 
player who fails to chase the ball when he might, in fact, reach it in time. For cases will 
arise sooner or later where Raphael  believes he knows he won’t reach the ball, but in fact 
doesn’t know this. In such cases, thanks to the habit he has inculcated in himself, Raph-
ael will sometimes end up reaching the ball. On the other hand,  Andi doesn’t chase the 
ball both in cases where he knows that he won’t reach it,  and in those cases in which 
he falsely takes himself to know that he won’t reach it. In this way, Andi—in failing to 
chase the ball even when he knows he won’t reach it—inculcates in himself an undesir-
able habit. While we thus might all agree that there is something untoward about Andi’s 
behaviour on the court, it seems very odd to think, as a defeatist view suggests, that his 
giving up in the good case costs him knowledge. Similarly, there is something untoward 
about dogmatism. But it is similarly odd to think that untoward dogmatism costs 
knowledge. 
 Consider a version of Bridge Builder in which Arthur does not disagree with Simon, 
but instead voices a much milder protest. Suppose Simon calculates the number of struts 
required and comes to know that he knows that twelve struts are needed. Suppose then 
Arthur expresses a little epistemic apprehension: ‘Perhaps you should double check. It 
would be really awful if you made a mistake.’ Simon dogmatically presses forward and 
brushes off  Arthur’s concerns. Here too we feel that Simon is getting into bad habits—
but it would be rather far-fetched to suppose that Arthur’s apprehension serves to defeat 
Simon’s knowledge that he knows. 31 Plausibly, dangerous dogmatic habits do not gener-
ally cost one the ability to know. 
 31 There is a contextualist model of what is going here with which we won’t engage: Arthur’s apprehen-
sion puts Simon in a context where the relation he now expresses by ‘knows’ is one in which he does not 
stand to the fact that twelve struts are required, even if he continues to stand in the relation that he previ-
ously expressed by ‘knows’ to that fact (and even, perhaps, continues to stand in the relation to the fact 
consisting of his standing in that relation to the fact).  
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 Now it might be thought that there is a crucial diff erence between the case in which 
Arthur merely expresses apprehension and in which Arthur actually voices a contradic-
tory opinion. For on some tempting probabilistic models, the fact of Arthur’s disagree-
ment makes it  no longer likely from Simon’s perspective that twelve struts are required, 
thereby costing Simon his original knowledge. How so? Suppose, as seems natural, that 
for S to know  p ,  p must have a suitably high probability on S’s evidence. And suppose 
that prior to hearing Arthur’s opinion, Simon’s epistemic probability in the fact that the 
bridge requires twelve struts was suffi  ciently high for Simon to know it. Assuming that 
Simon knows that Arthur has a very good track record, the epistemic probability (for 
Simon) that Arthur will agree with Simon is high. But it is easy to have the intuition that 
the probability of the fact that twelve struts are required,  conditional on Arthur’s disagree-
ing with Simon, is not high enough for knowledge. 32 ,  33 But note that models like this 
are of no use if one thinks of knowing  p as suffi  cient for  p ’s being part of one’s body of 
evidence. For insofar as Simon’s total body of evidence  includes the fact that twelve struts 
are required, he will hardly be able to conditionalize his way to a less than high probabil-
ity in this fact. It is worth underscoring the oddness of leaving out the relevant piece of 
knowledge from Simon’s total body of evidence. As we naturally think about the case, 
we take all sorts of other bits of knowledge that Simon has as suffi  cient for rendering 
various facts part of his evidence. If, for example, we think of Simon as knowing various 
facts about Arthur’s track record, we are  ipso facto inclined to count those facts as part of 
what Simon has to go on. Leaving out the bridge-building facts that he knows from his 
body of evidence thus might seem somewhat ad hoc.  At the very least, probabilistic 
considerations need not force us to accept a defeatist view on which habitual blame-
worthy right-doing in disagreements such as this is an incoherent phenomenon. Indeed, 
from a perspective according to which knowing  p is suffi  cient for  p ’s being part of one’s 
evidence, such a defeatist view is implausible. 
 What of the phenomenon of  evidential blameworthy right-doing? In such cases, S 
conforms to KDN although it is likely on her evidence that she isn’t so conforming. 
According to a defeatist view on which blameworthy epistemic conduct is incompati-
ble with knowledge, such cases cannot arise. To fl esh out this kind of view, fans of defeat 
often argue that something like the following is true:
 Evidence-Bridge Principle (EBP): If it is likely on S’s evidence that S doesn’t know  p , then S doesn’t 
know  p. 
 32 As many have noted, such models face diffi  culties in dealing with disagreements about mathematics 
and logic, since standard probabilistic models assign probability 1 to all mathematical and logical truths. This 
precludes disagreement having any potential to lower probabilities via conditionalization. The challenge of 
making good on some notion of non-idealized probabilities is not an easy one to meet. We return to this 
theme briefl y in the next section.  
 33 Note that even if Simon’s track record is known to be a bit better than Arthur’s, that will not help much 
(vis-à-vis a setting where Arthur is considered a peer). Suppose Simon’s conditional probability of his being 
right conditional on a disagreement is 0.6, of Arthur being right 0.4. That would still, on this model, give 
disagreement a knowledge-destroying eff ect (assuming 0.6 is too low for knowledge). Thus, on such a 
model, epistemic peerhood is not what is crucial.  
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 EBP will not be tempting for defenders of multi-premise closure concerning know-
ledge. By multi-premise closure, if one knows each of a number of premises and deduces 
their conjunction, then one knows the conjunction. But suppose each conjunct is such 
that one does not know that one knows it and, indeed, that for each premise there is 
some non-negligible likelihood that one does not know it. Then it will be easy to fl esh 
out the case such that it is likely on one’s evidence that one does not know the conclu-
sion. (Except in special cases where the risks of failing to know each conjunct are highly 
interdependent, the risks will add up to a large risk given enough conjuncts.) 
 Of more general interest here is Williamson’s recent persuasive case against any such 
bridge principle, one that shows its incompatibility with natural ways of thinking about 
margins of error. 34 Imagine you are looking at a pointer on a dial. Given the distance 
you are from the dial, the particular light conditions, and so on, there exists some margin 
of error  n such that that there is some strongest proposition  p you are in a position to 
know of the form  the pointer is plus or minus n degrees from point x , where  x is the actual 
position of the pointer. If you were to believe, say, that  the pointer is plus or minus n-1 
degrees from point x , you would not in fact  know this proposition. Suppose, on this particu-
lar occasion, the strongest proposition you know about the position of the pointer is the 
proposition  p , that the pointer is within range Q. That is, for all you know, the pointer is 
anywhere within the range Q, a range which has position  x , the actual position, at its 
centre. Now, note that nearly all of the positions within Q preclude knowing  p . If, say, 
the position of the pointer were closer to the edge of Q than point  x , then one’s margin 
for error would preclude knowing  p . So it is very unlikely, relative to the propositions 
that you know (including  p itself), that you know  p . 35 ,  36 ,  37 
 The general upshot of  Williamson’s argument, we take it, is the following. Defeatism 
can be helpfully thought of as a view on which knowledge is what we might call a 
‘minimally luminous’ state.  A minimally luminous state is one such that whenever one is 
in it, it is not the case that it’s  unlikely on one’s evidence that one is in it. But Williamson’s 
argument suggests that, given some plausible assumptions about margins of error, 
knowledge is not even minimally luminous. 38 If one clings onto EBP in the face of such 
cases it seems that one will be forced to deny that there is any such thing as the strongest 
proposition one knows, which in turn seems to generate a forced march to a sceptical 
 34  Timothy Williamson, ‘Improbable Knowing’ in Trent Dougherty (ed.)  Evidentialism and Its Discontents 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) , ch. 9.  
 35 Note that the argument makes no particular assumptions about how much you know about the posi-
tion of the pointer, beyond the anti-sceptical assumption that in such a case one knows something about the 
position of the pointer by visual inspection.  
 36 We also note in passing that the models that Williamson describe wherein one knows even though it 
is likely on one’s evidence that one does not know can easily be extended to describe cases where one 
knows even though one  knows that it is likely on one’s evidence that one does not know.  
 37 As Williamson notes, the argument will need to be complicated a bit further to account for ‘inexactness 
in our knowledge of the width of the margin for error’ (‘Improbable Knowing’, 155).We shall not go 
through the argument that incorporates variable margins here.  
 38 Williamson’s argument, like his anti-luminosity argument, generalizes to all non-trivial conditions.  We 
focus here on knowledge so as to intersect with the debate about defeat.  
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conclusion that one knows nothing about the relevant subject matter. So we are faced 
with a choice between abandoning evidence- or justifi cation-bridge principles on one 
hand, and embracing radical scepticism on the other. 39 Assuming Williamson is right, 
then not only can one not eliminate the case of habitual blameworthy right-doing using 
defeat considerations; non-transparency means that one cannot eliminate the case of 
evidential blameworthy right-doing either. 
 We certainly do not take ourselves to have shown that epistemologists are misguided 
in positing the phenomenon of defeat. 40 But we do take ourselves to have made trouble 
for one of the plausible motivations for defeatist views—namely, that of trying to align 
knowledge with epistemic virtue. One obviously cannot eliminate the myriad cases of 
blameless wrongdoing using defeat considerations. But of more interest is that one can-
not plausibly eliminate the paradigmatic cases of blameworthy right-doing, either. 41 
 6 The two-state solution 
 There is certainly some intuitive pull to the thought that, in addition to an ‘ought’ gov-
erned by outcomes, we need an ‘ought’ that is tied to praiseworthy epistemic conduct—
just as it is natural to draw an analogous distinction in the moral realm between what 
one  objectively ought to do and what one  subjectively ought to do. That said, the praise-
connected ‘ought’ is rather more elusive than it initially seems. In this section we explain 
why. Again, our explanation will turn on considerations of non-transparency. 
 A natural fi rst pass on the ‘subjective’ epistemic ought will mimic its standard ana-
logue in the moral sphere:  one ought to do that which has greatest expected epistemic utility . 
Suppose that there exists some fi xed scale of epistemic utility in the disagreement situa-
tion that is KDN-inspired. 42  Then, the idea goes, the praiseworthiness of epistemic 
conduct is given by this scale in combination with the facts about the subject’s particular 
epistemic situation. Such an ‘ought’ can in principle sit perfectly well alongside an 
‘ought’ whose ordering source is generated by a ranking of outcomes. The introduction 
of this subjective ‘ought’ is thus not an objection to KDN; instead, it is supplementary 
structure designed to remedy those ways in which KDN is silent. One might also argue 
that this subjective ‘ought’ is truer to the context in which philosophers or the folk raise 
 39 Similar arguments can be formulated against analogous bridge principles, for example, ones that rely 
on  safety or  reliability as the salient notion.  
 40 For a general anti-defeat case see  Maria Lasonen Aarnio,  Indefeasible Knowledge (DPhil dissertation, 
University of Oxford, 2009) and ‘Unreasonable Knowledge’,  Philosophical Perspectives 24, 2010. The present 
discussion is signifi cantly infl uenced by those writings.  
 41 These considerations also raise the question of whether continuing to believe when it’s likely on one’s 
evidence that one does not know is even intuitively blameworthy in general. After all, it is far from clear that 
we fi nd the pointer-looker intuitively blameworthy for believing the strongest proposition that she knows. 
 42 It can be at best inspired and not determined by KDN. To fi x a scale of this sort will require far more 
than a ranking that, say, puts knowledge on top, withheld belief second, knowledge-less true belief third, and 
knowledge-less false belief fourth. A full valuational structure would both rank outcomes and provide valu-
ational  distances between them.  
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questions about how to deal with disagreement, and as such is a better answer to the 
question with which we began. 
 That said, the ‘subjective’ epistemic ought might fail to capture our intuitive rankings 
of epistemic praiseworthiness. Here are three reasons why. First, it is easy to imagine 
cases in which one is not in a position to know of the presence or absence of a piece of 
evidence: that is, cases in which one’s  evidence is non-transparent. This is especially obvi-
ous if one’s evidence is that which one knows: if one knows  p but is not in a position to 
know that one knows  p , then one is not in a position to know that  p is part of one’s evi-
dence. Conversely, if one  doesn’t know  p but is in no position to know that one does not 
know  p , then one is not in a position to know that  p is not part of one’s evidence. This 
possibility will again generate instances of blameworthy right-doing and blameless 
wrongdoing. Suppose, for example, that Sally justifi ably takes herself to know certain 
false propositions about Harry’s reliability; she has lots of misleading evidence that Harry 
is extremely reliable. Relative to everything that Sally justifi ably takes herself to know, 
the course of action with maximum expected epistemic utility is for her to trust Harry, 
but relative to what Sally  in fact knows, the course of action with maximum expected 
epistemic utility is dogmatism. Using the subjective ‘ought’—that is, the ‘ought’ tied to 
expected epistemic utility—we can say that Sally ought to be dogmatic. However, intui-
tively, if Sally were instead to trust Harry, she would be blameless for so doing. Thus, an 
‘ought’ tied to expected epistemic utility will not necessarily match our intuitions about 
praiseworthy and blameworthy epistemic conduct. 
 This result is unsurprising, of course, given a conception of evidence on which know-
ing  p is necessary and suffi  cient for  p ’s being part of one’s evidence. Knowledge is non-
transparent, and non-transparency gives rise to instances of normative divergence. Thus, 
one might reasonably think that we are working here with the wrong conception of 
evidence, a conception that is unsuited to our intuitions about praiseworthy and blame-
worthy epistemic conduct. However, this problem plausibly cannot be avoided by 
switching to a diff erent notion of evidence. For assuming that no non-trivial condition 
is such that either its absence or presence is luminous, 43 there will always be the possibil-
ity of a mismatch between one’s evidence and what one is in a position to know about 
one’s evidence. 
 A tempting thought here is that the subjective ‘ought’ is a measure of what is best  by 
one’s own lights . But that thought becomes less tempting once we realize that whatever 
our gloss on ‘our lights’, there will plausibly be cases in which agents are justifi ably mis-
taken about their own lights. In that case the phenomenon that gave rise to blame worthy 
right-doing and blameless wrongdoing with respect to the ‘objective’ ought—namely, 
 43 For a persuasive case against the luminosity of any non-trivial condition, see Williamson ( Knowledge and 
Its Limits ), ch. 4. One can also generate less nuanced (but perhaps equally convincing) arguments for this 
conclusion. For example, consider the condition of  being in pain , which seems to be as good a candidate as 
any for a luminous condition. It seems highly plausible that with suffi  cient psychological priming, one may 
inevitably mistake a pain for an itch or a sensation of intense cold.  
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a mismatch between the facts pertinent to what one ought to do and what one takes 
those facts to be—re-emerges for the ‘by one’s lights’ ought. In short, if we introduce an 
‘ought’ tied to expected epistemic utility, then the phenomena of blameworthy right-
doing and blameless wrongdoing will still arise relative to  that ‘ought’, again because of 
the non-transparency of evidence. 
 A second potential source of limitation in the expected epistemic utility model con-
cerns mismatches between the actual probabilistic connections and what one justifi ably 
takes them to be. Suppose, for example, that one is deciding whether to trust someone 
about a certain proposition that is in fact a complex theorem of classical logic. If epis-
temic probabilities are standard, at least to the extent that all logical truths are assigned 
probability 1, then the facts of the disagreement will be probabilistically irrelevant. The 
proposition will have probability 1 relative to all facts, and the expected epistemic utility 
of trusting one’s interlocutor will be calculated accordingly. It is obvious enough, then, 
that any such conception of probability will induce intuitively compelling cases of 
blameless wrongdoing and blameworthy right-doing. But it is not obvious that we can 
contrive a non-idealized notion of probability that will provide a more satisfying gauge 
of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. 44 Note that even if the operative notion of 
probability were subjective probability, that will not avoid the general worry, since there 
is no reason to expect that subjective probabilities are themselves luminous. This is espe-
cially clear if subjective probabilities are a matter of one’s dispositions over all bets, since 
there is no guarantee that one is in a position to know one’s own dispositions. But even 
if one thinks of assigning a subjective probability to a proposition as more akin to, say, 
feeling cold than being disposed to bet, anti-luminosity arguments for feeling cold will 
still apply. 
 Third and fi nally, the expected epistemic utility conception also fails to take account 
of the habitual considerations advanced earlier.  What those considerations seem to indi-
cate is that there are cases in which one knows that a certain action has greatest expected 
epistemic utility (using a KDN-inspired scale), but in which one is, nonetheless, blame-
worthy for doing it and blameless for not doing it.  Ex hypothesi , Bridge Builder Simon 
knows that he knows that twelve struts are required, and hence (on very plausible 
assumptions) will be in a position to know that sticking to his guns has maximum 
expected epistemic utility (at least assuming that knowing  p is suffi  cient for  p to count as 
 44 Note that in general one source of instability in our practices of praising and blaming others is the 
extent to which we take badly formed beliefs as nevertheless providing an excuse for some course of action. 
Consider the case of Frank, who is deciding how to respond to a disagreement about whether- p . Frank’s 
disagreeing interlocutor knows not- p and Frank’s evidence provides strong support for the hypothesis that 
the interlocutor knows not- p . But Frank is in the grip of a bad argument whose conclusion is that the disa-
greement is suffi  cient to preclude his interlocutor’s knowing. Should we say that Frank ought to ignore the 
bad argument and go ahead and trust the interlocutor? Or should we say that Frank ought not to trust the 
interlocutor given the (misguided) argument he fi nds persuasive? Similar issues arise when contriving a 
‘subjective’ ought for people with misguided moral convictions. See  Gideon Rosen, ‘Skepticism About 
Moral Responsibility’,  Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004): 295-313 ; see also  Michael J. Zimmerman, ‘Moral 
Responsibility and Ignorance’,  Ethics 107 (1997): 410-28 .  
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evidence). 45 But as we have said, it is easy to get into a frame of mind where, despite 
these facts, we think of his sticking to his guns as a worse course of action than, say, 
 shifting to agnosticism. 
 Note that habitual distinctions can even make a diff erence to expected epistemic 
utilities once we shift from a KDN-inspired scale to one that looks at the longer term. 
Even if one thinks of knowledge as the hallmark of epistemic success, one might grade 
an action such as sticking to one’s guns by long-run consequences for knowledge rather 
than by the very short-term consequentialism encoded by KDN. Similarly, one could 
have a subjective ‘ought’ that was geared to longer-term consequences. Consider a situ-
ation where S knows that she knows, but also knows that by being dogmatic now she 
will make it likely that she will dogmatically cling to false beliefs in the future. Here, 
being dogmatic will straightforwardly have maximum expected utility for S according 
to a KDN-inspired scale, but may well not have maximum expected utility when a 
longer-term scale is in play. 
 What we have seen so far is that a two-state solution that uses KDN-inspired expected 
epistemic utility as the ground for the so-called subjective ‘ought’ does not do what it is 
designed to do, namely generate an ‘ought’ that aligns with our intuitive judgments 
about praise and blame. This is because non-transparency is inescapable: as we attempt to 
index our ‘ought’ to more stably accessible or ‘subjective’ conditions, we come up against 
possible cases in which agents fail to be in a position to know whether those conditions 
obtain—and thus fail to be in a position where they are blameworthy for failing to do 
what they ought to do, or vice versa. 
 7 Disagreement, despair, and beyond 
 We have suggested that those of us who hope for a general and intuitively satisfying 
answer to the question that is at the centre of the disagreement debate—namely, what 
we ought to do, epistemically speaking, when faced with disagreement—might be hop-
ing in vain. There are deep structural reasons why such an answer has proven, and will 
continue to prove, elusive. Intuitively, we expect epistemic norms to be  normatively satis-
fying: that is, we expect them to track our intuitions about blameworthy and praise-
worthy epistemic conduct. An epistemic norm that ties what one ought to do to a 
non-transparent condition (e.g. knowledge) is an epistemic norm that will not satisfy 
this basic desideratum. To construct an epistemic norm that is normatively satisfying, 
then, we require an epistemic ‘ought’ that is tied to only transparent conditions; unfortu-
nately, no such conditions plausibly exist. As such, the hope of fi nding a normatively 
satisfying answer to the disagreement question seems like a hope unlikely to be 
satisfi ed. 
 45 We say ‘on plausible assumptions’ because, for example, one might know that one knows  p in a dis-
agreement situation and yet conceivably not know whether, if one sticks to one’s guns one will suddenly 
start believing  p for bad reasons that are not one’s current basis for believing  p .  
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 Where does this leave us? One kind of reaction to all this is to despair of any cogent 
treatment of non-ideal cases. For example, we might say that expected epistemic utility 
works as a measure for epistemic praise and blame for creatures for whom evidence and 
probabilistic connections are completely transparent. 46 (Habitual wrongdoing can’t 
arise for such creatures, since that phenomenon requires the non-luminosity of the 
absence of knowledge.) And we might contend that for non-ideal creatures there is no 
stable measure of epistemic praise and blame, and that associated ‘ought’ claims are not 
ultimately coherent. Since we are squarely non-ideal creatures, we think this is despair 
indeed. 47 
 Another kind of response fi nds fault in the attempt to formalize praiseworthiness in 
the guise of KDN-inspired expected utility. One might hold that facts about one’s evi-
dence provide some reason to do this or that, but that facts about what one takes one’s 
evidence to be, as well as facts about what habits a course of action inculcates, also pro-
vide reason to do this or that.  And one might hope, moreover, that there exists, at least in 
many cases, a fact about what one has ‘all things considered’ reason to do. Less commit-
tedly, one might envisage an ordering source that directly ranks acts in terms of com-
parative praiseworthiness, perhaps without trying to give any sort of quasi-reductive 
account of what grounds these facts of relative praiseworthiness. At least one problem 
with these responses is that they fail to notice the ways that praise and blame reactions 
can be tied to various parameters that cannot plausibly be brought together into an ‘all 
things considered’ or ‘on balance’ judgment. Consider again Andi, who gives up chasing 
the ball in cases where he knows that he won’t reach it. If we focus on the local scenario, 
Andi’s actions seem unassailable; after all, he gives up when he knows it is futile. By con-
trast, Raphael’s behaviour seems a little lamentable; after all, he keeps chasing when he 
knows he can’t reach the ball. But if we shift to a more global outlook, we can see Andi’s 
course of action as problematic and blameworthy, Raphael’s as noble and praiseworthy. 
It is far from clear that one of these outlooks has any special authority over the other. 
 The preceding refl ections point to what some will take to be the most promising 
option apart from despair: namely, to claim that even within the realm of the more ‘sub-
jective’ ought, there is context-dependence according to the kinds of weightings of 
values that are operative at a context. There isn’t a single ordering source associated with 
evaluating the subject ‘by her own lights’. Rather, perhaps, there are a range of candi-
date-ordering sources to which one might semantically tie ‘ought’ claims, and which 
one might allow to dictate one’s reactive attitudes. Note that such context-dependence 
will likely infect other normative terms like ‘reasonable’ and ‘rational’. From this per-
spective, it is an illusion to think one has fi xed one’s subject matter by saying ‘I am using 
the “ought” of rationality here’, for there will simply be  no privileged ‘ought’ of rational-
ity. One pressing question for this approach is how it handles the question as to which of 
 46 Thanks to David Chalmers for pushing this point.  
 47 Moreoever, if we require that the evidence of one’s interlocutor be completely transparent as well as 
one’s own, that makes the ideal case particularly far removed from ordinary disagreement. And if knowledge 
suffi  ces for evidence it precludes disagreements where one of the parties knows.  
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the various reactive attitudes—praise, blame, and so on—one ought to have. It’s natural 
to think that the context in which one says ‘Andi ought to give up’ should also be a con-
text in which it is appropriate to say ‘People ought not to condemn Andi for giving up’, 
and indeed is a context where one condemns the person who condemns Andi, and so 
on. But this kind of contextualism is one where ‘ought’ seems to lose much of its moti-
vational power once the contextualism has been refl ectively absorbed. If one overhears 
someone saying ‘Andi ought to be praised for giving up’, it is hard to be much moved by 
that when one is aware that at other contexts, some can speak truly (about the same 
action) by saying ‘Andi ought to be condemned for giving up’. 
 Finally, others will be tempted by a more expressivist reaction: ‘ought’ claims express 
kinds of recommendations, though there are both diff erent styles of recommendations 
(the bouletic style has a diff erent fl avour from the deontic style, and within the deontic 
style, some are made in an advisory spirit, some in an optative spirit), and diff erent moods 
in which we make them (sometimes we are looking at the longer term, sometimes the 
shorter term; sometimes we are driven by certain wishes and concerns, sometimes by 
others). How much either contextualism or expressivism really buys us over outright 
despair we leave to the reader to judge. 
 Our goal was to suggest that a natural hope—that we might settle on an intuitively 
satisfying and principled answer to the disagreement question—might remain unsatis-
fi ed. This becomes clear, we think, when we take seriously the non-transparency of any 
condition that might plausibly play a role in an epistemic norm. Since knowledge is 
obviously non-transparent, norms like KDN fail to live up to our normative expecta-
tions in some fairly obvious ways. But alternatives, like the claim that  one ought to do what 
has greatest expected epistemic utility , again fail to satisfy our evaluative intuitions. We don’t 
mean this to be a serious recommendation of KDN as an answer to the disagreement 
question. Indeed, our intention has been to suggest that there seems to be no single 
privileged answer to the question ‘What ought we to do, epistemically speaking, when 
faced with a disagreement?’ This thought, bleak as it might be, easily leads to bleaker 
thoughts.  We have not argued for the conclusion here, but it seems that non- transparency 
poses a more general problem for the ambition to formulate all sorts of epistemic 
norms. 48 If so, then it is not just a stable answer to the disagreement question that will 
remain elusive, but also stable answers to  all questions concerning what we ought to do, 
epistem ically speaking. 
 48 For a general discussion of the implications of non-transparency for normative theorizing, see Amia 
Srinivasan’s “What’s in a Norm?” (in progress).  
